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White v. State: And Now for Something Different
SusAN STUART*
RICHARD PITTS**

I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 10, 1986, one could almost hear a collective sigh of
despair arise from the ranks of criminal defense counsel and public
d-e fenders in the state of Indiana. On that day, the Indiana Supreme
1
Court handed down White v. State, an opinion that addresses the
question of what standard should be employed in adjudging a defendant's
petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty plea was not
made voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly. Although cases addressing
this question are too numerous to mention, White differed from many
of the others because, once again, the supreme court changed the standard. The White case became the fifth such change in less than ten
years. The first change occurred in Neeley v. State2 in 1978, followed
by German v. Stat& in 1981. The Indiana General Assembly then made
an addition to the guilty plea statute in 1984. 4' The fourth change occurred
in Austin v. State, 5 a supreme court opinion attempting to offset the
statutory. addition. This lack of consistency in the area of post-conviction
relief can only lead to an increasingly frustrated criminal bar, particularly
because the ramifications of White are very problematic given the current
uncertain application of the law as well as the loose ends created by
the case itself.
This Article will, after a brief exposition of pre- White post-conviction
relief under Indiana law, analyze White v. State as it stands alone and
will attempt to unravel some of the issues raised by its holding and
retroactive application. Because of the shifting and varied considerations
of any single fact situation, the conclusions drawn here are necessarily
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broad. Indeed, research reveals that there simply is no definitive rule
of law in the White situation. Consequently, this Article can do nothing
more than attempt to shed light on a limited number of discrete issues
defense counsel may wish to consider in their guilty plea practice.

II.

BACKGROUND oF PosT-CoNVICTION RELIEF IN INDIANA

The genesis of state post-conviction relief is found in three United
States Supreme Court cases. In Mooney v. Holohan, 6 the Supreme Court
held only that the habeas corpus procedures of California were, standing
alone, apparently sufficient to meet the minimum requirements of due
process in giving post-conviction litigants some forum in which to vindicate their claims. 7 Probably b.ecause .of this less than forceful pronouncement, the status of state post-conviction relief remained relatively
unchanged until Young v. Ragen. 8 In Young, the Court pointed out
that states are obligated, under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause, to give those convicted in state court a clearly defined method
by which claims alleging denial of a federal constitutional right could
be litigated. 9
In 1965; the Court was poised to confront squarely the question of
whether the lack of a post-conviction remedy was itself a denial of due
process. The case was set against the backdrop of an increase in the
number of federal habeas corpus actions. After certiorari was granted
in Case v. Nebraska, 10 the Nebraska legislature enacted a statewid·e post. .
conviction procedure. As a result, the Court in Case simply· vacated the
judgment and remanded for reconsideration under the new Nebraska
statute. 11 Of particular note is Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, in
which he delineated some of the characteristics of an appropriate state
post-conviction procedure. Justice Brennan wrote:
'

The procedure should be swift and simple and easily invoked.
It should be sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all federal
constitutional claims. . . . [l]t should eschew rigid and technical
doctrines of forfeiture, waiver or default. It should provide for
full fact hearings to resolve disputed factual issues, and for
compilation of a record to enable federal courts to determine
the sufficiency of those hearings . It should provide for decisions
supported by opinions, or fact findings and conclusions of law,

11

294

u.s.

103 (1935).
7
ld. at 113.
8
337 u.s. 235 (1949).
9
/d. at 239.
10
177 Neb. 404. 129 N.W.2d 107, cert. granted 379 U.S. 958 (1965).
6

Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965).
•
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which disclose the grounds of decision and the resolution of
disputed facts. Provision for counsel to represent prisoners . . .
would enhance the probability of effective presentation and proper
disposition of prisoners' claims. 12
Similar themes have been sounded by the American Bar Association 13
14
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniforn1 State Laws.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform S~ate Laws, in
its prefatory notes to the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, listed
the following goals of the act:
1. A simple and expeditious procedure;
2. A single procedure obviating the need for state habeas corpus
or coram nobis proceedings;
3. Disposition on the merits of the claims whenever possible;
4. Elimination of subsequent post-conviction petitions by the
same petitioner CQncerning the same conviction.I 5
In large measure, the Indiana Rules of Post-Conviction Relief are designed
to effectuate the same goals. 16
Post-conviction relief in Indiana has developed considerably over the
last 100 years. During the nineteenth century; courts operated und~r the
premise that a priso~er's word was sufficient to establish guilt. 17 Courts
later began to evolve devices for making certain that pleas were not
induced by threat or coercion but by voluntary and intelligent choice . 18
In order to process guilty pleas more systematically, the Indiana General
~

/d. at 346-47 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted)~ Justice Brennan also
noted that the Nebraska statute was, "plainly an adequate corrective process." /d.
nSee American Bar ASsociation, Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies,
§ 4. 5 (1967 tentative draft and commentary; American Bar Association, Standards Relating
to Pleas of Guilty (1967 tentative draft).
14
See UNIF. PosT-CONVICTION PROCEDURE AcT § 1 comment, 11 U.L.A. 233, 234
(1980).
15
UNIF. PosT CoNVICTION PROCEDURE AcT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 11 U.L.A.
477, 479-80 (1966), Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
u~see IND. R. P. POST-CONVICTION. REMEDIES 1 § l(b) (as to unitary remedy); and
§ 8 (as to single proceeding arising from conviction).
11
Griffith v. State, 36 Ind. 406, 408 (1871).
"White v. State,, 497 N.E.2d 893, 895 (Ind. 1986). See, e.g., Crooks v. State, 214
Ind. 505, 15 ·N .E.2d 359 (1938); Myers v. State, 115 Ind. 554, 18 N.E. 42 (1888). Although
the White opinion does not elaborate on these developments to protect a defendant, they
include the requirement that the guilty plea be transcribed, that the defendant be informed
of the ramifications of his guilty plea, and that a route be provided for withdrawing. a
plea on collateral attack. See IND. R. CRIM. P. 10; State v. Lindsey, 231 Ind. 125, 106
N.E.2d 230 (1952).
11

•
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Assembly enacted Indiana Code section 35-4.1-1-3,1 9 setting forth the
advisements a trial court must make to the pleading defendant, and
Indiana Code section 35-4.1-1-4,20 specifying the findings a trial court
must make in order to establish that a defendant has properly entered
his plea. 21 ·
The first opinion interpreting the requirements set forth in these
statutory provisions was Neeley v. State. 22 In Neeley, the supreme court
found the record established that the defendant actually knew about the
rights he was waiving. Consequently, the court concluded that even
though the trial judge did not follow the statutory requirements to the
letter, the defendant, as a result of his knowledge, was not entitled to
post-conviction relief. 23
Section. 3 provided:
The court shall not accept a plea· of guilty from the defendant without first
addressing the defendant and
(a) determining that he understands the nature of the charge against him;
(b) informing him that by his plea of guilty he is admitting the truth of all
facts alleged in the indictment or information or to an offense included thereunder
and that upon entry of such plea the court shall proceed with judgment and
sentence;
(c) informing him that by his plea of guilty he waives his rights to a public
and speedy trial by jury, to face the witn~sses against him, to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to require the state to prove
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant may not
be compelled to testify against himself;
(d) informing him of the maximum possible sentenc.e and minimum sentence
for the offense charged and of any possible increased sentence by reason of
the fact of a prior conviction or convictions., and of any possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e) informing him that the court is not a party to any agreement which may
have been made between the prosecutor and the defense and is not bound
thereby.
IND. CODE § 35..4.1-1-3 (repealed 1981).
20
Section 4 provided:
(a) The court shall not accept a, plea of guilty without first personally addressing
the defendant and determining that the plea is voluntary. The court shall address
the defendant and determine whether any promises. force or threats were used
to obtain the plea.
(b) The court shall not enter judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied
from its examination of the defendant that there is a factual basis for the plea.
(c) A plea of guilty shall not be deemed to be involuntary under subsection (a)
of this section solely because it is the product of an agreement between the
prosecution and the defense.
IND. CODE § 35-4.1-1-4 (repealed 1981). .
21
Act of Apr. 23, 1973, Pub. L. No. 325, § 4, 1973 Ind. Acts 1750, 1789-90.
Perhaps, not coincidentally, these statutory provisions were enacted shortly after the bedrock
guilty plea case of Boykin v. Alabama. 39~ U.S. 238 (1969).
22
269 Ind. 588, 382 N.E.2d 714 (1978).
23/d. at 595-96, 382 N.E.2d ·at 718.
19
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In 1981, the Indiana Supreme Court overruled Neeley in German
v. State, 24 stating that "it is the duty of the trial judge to comply strictly
with the terms of IND. ConE § 35-4.1-1·3 . . . . '' 25 The court ultimately
held that the failure of the trial judge to '' [a]ddress the defendant
according to the requirements and determine that the defendant under~
stands the charges against him'' required that the guilty pleas be vacated
and the matter be tried. 26
In response to the strict requirement set forth in German, the Indiana
General Assembly added the following language to Indiana Code section
35-35-1-2: 27 (c) Any variance from the requirements of this s~ction that
does not violate a constitutional right of the defendant is not a basis
for setting aside a plea of guilty. 28
Such a change "cut at the heart of the German decision, which
had described the judge's obligation to advise defendants as 'statutory. '" 29 In· answer to the legislature's action, the supreme court, in
Austin v. State, 30 declared the "harmless error" provision set forth in
Indiana Code section 35-35-1-2(c) a nullity on the premise the advisements set forth in subsection 35:.35-1-2(a)31 are of constitutional dimen2A428 N.E.2d 234 (Ind. 1981).
2' /d. at 236.
26 /d. at 236-37.
21
ln 1981, the legislature repealed sections 35-4.1-1-3 and 35-4.1-1-4 and replaced
them with sections 35-35-1-3 and 35-35-1-2 respectively. Act of May 5, 1981, Pub. L.
No. 298, §§ 4, 9, 1981 Ind. Acts 2314, 2366-67, 2391.
28
Act of Feb. 29, 1984, Pub. L. No. 179, § 1, 1984 Ind. Acts 1486, 1487 (codified
at IND. CoDE § 35-35-l-2(c) (Supp. 1987)).
29White v. State, 497 N. E. 2d 893, 896 (Ind. 1986) (citing German v. State, 428
N .E.2d 234, 237 (Ind. 1981)).
30
468 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 1984).
31
This section provides:
(a) The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill
at the time of the crime without first determining that the defendant:
(1) understands the nature of the charge against him;
(2) has been informed that by his plea he waives his rights to:
(A) a public and speedy trial by jury;
(B) confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him;
(C) have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and
(D) require the. state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial
at which the defendant may not be compelled to testify against himself;
(3) has been informed of the maximum possible sentence and minimum sentence
for the crime charged and any possible increased sentence by reason of the fact
of a prior conviction or convictions, and any possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences; and
·
(4) has been informed that if:
(A) there is a plea agreement as defined by IC 35-35-3-l; and
(B) the court accepts the plea;
the court is bound by the term of the plea agreement.
IND. CODE § 35-35~ l-2(a) (Supp. 1987).

•
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sion. 32 This ruling set the stage for the White court's divergence from
prior law in its interpretation of the statute and of the standard by
which a trial court's advisements are to be measured.

III.

White v. State, THE

CASE

Randy White pleaded guilty, in September 1981, to charges of burglary and theft and received consecutive sentences of ten and two years,
respectively. 33 Two years later, White filed a petition for post-conviction
relief seeking to set his plea aside on the ground that the trial court
failed to advise him of the possible minimum sentences applicable to
each charge if he had elected to go to trial rather than to plead guilty. 34
He claimed the absence of this advisement rendered his plea involuntary,
unintelligent, and unknowing. 35 The trial court denied the petition, and
White appealed. In an unpublished memorandum opinion, 36 the Indiana
Court of Appeals agreed with White and reversed the trial court, thereby
giving him the opportunity to withdraw his plea.:n After the denial of
its rehearing petition, 38 the State sought transfer to the supreme court,
evidently to curb a rising tide of identical post-conviction relief petitions
presenting the same fatal flaw~ 39 This time, the State succeeded .

The Austin court stated:
An accused's entitlement to such advisements, therefore, flows from his due
process right to be sheltered from the consequences of a guilty plea entered on
less than an informed judgment and not from the legislative inclusion of it in
its codification. The legislature may, as a matter of public policy, require
advisements that are not of such dimension, but it could not eliminate the
requirements of those essential to an informed judgment, which includes the
one omitted by the court that accepted the guilty plea.
468 N.E.2d at 1028.
33 White, 497 N.E.2d at 894.
~/d. Post-conviction relief is afforded defendants under Rule 1 of the Indiana Rules
of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies.
35
497 N.E.2d at 894. In a footnote, the supreme court intimates it may as well
abandon the "knowingly" element for measuring the validity of a guilty plea: ld. n.l.
There is a question as to the wisdom of this statement in the face of constitutional
considerations. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Inasmuch as this statement
is mere dictum, this Article will continue to adhere to the tripartite terminology. See also
IND. CODE § 35-35-l-4(c)(3) (Supp. 1987).
36
White v. State, 465 N.E.2d 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
3
'White v. State, 465 N.E.2d 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), reh. denied, 484 N.B.2d 82
(Ind. Ct. App.
1985) .
.
38484 N .E.2d at 82.
39
£.g., Jones v. State, 478 N.E.2d 676 (Ind. 198.5); Williams v. State, 468 N.E~2d
1036 (Ind. 1984); Austin v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 1984).
32
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The supreme court, comprised of new members since the earlier
cases involving the same problem, 40 invoked a new standard for reviewing
guilty pleas:
A petitioner who claims that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent but can only establish that the trial judge failed to
give an advisement in accordance with § 35-35-1-2 has not met
his burden of proof. He needs to plead specific facts from which
a finder of fact could conclude by a preponderance of the
evidence that the trial judge's failure to make a full inquiry in
accordance with § 35-35-l-2(a) rendered his decision involuntary
or unintelligent. Of course, unless the record reveals that the
defendant knew or was advised at the time of his plea that he
was waiving his right to a jury trial, his right of confrontation
and his_ right against self~incrimination; Boykinl41 1 will require
that his conviction be vacated. 42

When compared to the standards assumed and discarded through the
yearsl White,s pro-n ouncement obviously instituted a. radical change in
the method of reviewing a guilty plea on collateral attack. The major
questions raised by this change are, how and why did the court arrive
at this new standard?
First, the White court declared that most of the statutory advisements
in Indiana Code section 35-35-1~2 lack constitutional foundation, citing
Boykin v. A/abama. 43 This statement is contrary to the Austin declaration.44 The court explains that Boykin
identified
only
three
rights
of
.
which a defendant need be advised as Inandated by the United States
Constitution "the_ right to a trial by jury, the right to confront one's
accusers, and the rig_h t against self-incrimination."45 From this statement,
the White court concluded that the other advisements in Indiana Code
section 35-35-l-2 are thus not guaranteed by the United States Constitution. By further extrapolation, the opinion also concluded that they
did not derive from the Indiana Constitution, particularly because the
words "due process" appear nowhere in it. 46 The court then engaged
'

•

'

.

.

Justices Shepard and Dickson joined the court in 1985 and 1986, respectively,
replacing Justices Hunter and Prentice who voted in the majority in Jones v. State, 478
N.E.2d 676 (Ind. 1985); Williams v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1036 (Ind. 1984); and Austin v.
State, 468 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 1984).
·UBoykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
41 White, 497 N .E.2d at 905-.
4
3395 u.s. 218 (1969).
44
497 N .E.2d at 897.
40

•~!d.

46[d.

•
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in a circuitous discussion refuting the rationale of Austin v. State, done
apparently in order to undermine the Austin court's declaration that the
German standard of strict adherence to the statutory procedure is undisputedly a province of the courts alone because of its constitutional
dimensions and is therefore outside the realm of the legislature's ''harmless error" codification. 47 Having thereby "weakened" the German standard, the White court continued in this vein to what appears to be the
true purpose of the opinion a criticism of the application of the strict
German-Austin review.
The court acknowledged the ease with which German can be applied
by ''being easy (o remember and easy to apply.'' 48 The court then set
forth the disadvantages to its application: common sense dictates that
some of the trial court's omissions are harmless, and post-conviction
relief proceedings are being abused by defendants who are exercising
their rights on the basis of these picayune errors. 49 In search of an
alternative to the German ''prophylactic'' rule, the supreme court turned
to the federal courts for guidance for a more appropriate standard.
The White opinion noted the fundamental inquiries federal
courts
.
have made into the voluntary, knowing and intelligent basis for a defendant's plea. For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in
United States v. Wetterlin,so looked to the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the plea to determine whether the defendant understood his
rights. 51 This issue was framed in Hill v. United States5z as, ''Was the
error in the proceeding a fundamental defect which inherently results
in a complete miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with
the rudimentary demands of fair procedure?'' 53 The White opinion makes
•
clear that these formulations of the fundamental issue arose in a context
similar to that of German and Austin-..··the impact of a "statutory" list
of advisements.
In the federal courts, however, this list of advisements takes the
form of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 54 Starting
•

'"/d. at 897-900. See Austin, 468 N.E.2d at 1028-29. See also supra notes 27-32 and
accompanying
text.
,
"'White, 497 N.E.2d at 900.
49fd.

583 F .2d 346, 354 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.· denied, 439 U.S. 1127 (1979).
1
' 497 N.E.2d at 902.
52
368 U.s. 424 (1962).
53
' White, 497 N.E.2d at 902 (citing Hill, 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
'"FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. Rule 11 (c) provides:
(c) Advice to the Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere,
the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform him
of, and d~termine that he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory
50

CRIMINAL LAW

1988]

93

with McCarthy v. United States,ss in which the United States Supreme
Court declared that a failure to comply with an early version of Rule
11 mandate·d vacation of a plea on direct appeal, the federal circuit
courts eventually reached a German-like conclusion that, under an amended
version of Rule 11, any violation of the rule was per se prejudicial even
on collateral attack. 56 However, the Supreme Court, in United States v.
Timmreck, 51 wholeheartedly rejected that conclusion where the trial court
had failed to inform a defendant of a mandatory special parole term.
The Court declared that where, as in Timmreck, the trial court has
committed only a violation of Rule 11 's "formal" requirements, collateral
relief from a guilty plea was not available. 58 In the context of Timmreck's
holding, the White court cites to various situations where other federal
courts have come to similar conclusions, by requiring a defendant to
show prejudice, 59 by declaring that reality rather than ritual must govern
review /J(} or by finding the lack of a certain advisement is harmless
error. 61 Rounding out its discussion and reaching its ultimate conclusion,
as set forth previously, the White opinion quoted from a recent case
from the Supreme Court, United States v. Mechanik, 62 which denounced

•

minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible
penalty provided by law, including the effect of any special parole
term and, when applicable, that the court may also order the defendant
to make restitution to any victim of the offense; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has
the right
to
be
represented
by
an
attorney
at
every
stage
of
the
.
.
proceeding against him and if necessary, one will be appointed to
represent him; and
(3) that he had the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea
if it has already been made, and he has the right to be tried by a
jury and at that trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the
right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; and
(4) that if his plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted by the
court there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading
guilty or nolo· contendere he waives the right to a trial; and
(5) if the court intends to question the defendant under oath, on the
record, and in the presence of counsel abo\lt the offense to which he
has pleaded, that his answers may later be used against him in a
prosecution for perjury or false statement.
55 394 u.s. 459 (1969).
6
' See, e.g., Timmreck v. United States, 577 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd 441 U.S.
'

780 (1979).
57

441
58 /d.
59497
6l>Jd.
6 lfd.
62
475

u.s.

780 (1979).

at 785.
N.E.2d at 904 (citing United States v. Caston, 615 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980)).
(citing United States v. Frazier, 705 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1983)).
(citing United States v. Stead 1 748 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1984)).
u.s. 66 (1986).
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the cost to ~ociety created by retrials as well as their detrimental effect
upon the criminal justice system. 63
Armed with these precedents the United States Supreme Court
denunciation of new trials and its own newly formulated standard the
Indiana Supreme Court applied its new declaration to Randy White's
petition and found that petition wanting. The court's review of the
transcript revealed that White had made no other case for withdrawal
of his plea beyond the mere assertion that the trial court failed to make
the single advisement set forth in Indiana Code section 35-35-l-2(a)
regarding minimum sentencing. 64 White presented no facts to show he
indeed did not know what the minimum sentences were nor had he
alleged any other facts indicating his guilty plea was anything but intelligent, voluntary and knowing. Specifically, White did not claim that
but for the trial court's error he would have decided to go to trial
rather than to plead guilty. 65 Therefore, the supreme court concluded,
Randy White had not borne his burden of showing by a preponderance
of the evidence that his petition for post-conviction relief should have
been granted and his plea withdrawn. 66

IV.

EvALUATION OF

White

Upon preliminary analysis of White, one's first instinct is to dismiss
it as incorrect on the basis of its flawed foundation and strained logic.
The federal case law cited by the court vacillates from standard to
standard, none of which the White court ever really adopted. In addition,
the opinion made no distinction between cases decided on direct appeal,
such as in McCarthy v. United States, 67 and cases decided on collateral
attack, such as United States v. Timmreck. 68 Ultimately, this distinction
is of little moment, but it casts an additional cloud on an opinion that
also relied on the rationale of a case that did not involve a guilty plea
at all, United States v. Mechanik. 69 These minor problems aside, one
is further confronted with the decision's strained efforts to substantiate
its credibility by attacking the Austin v. State70 and German v. State71
• •
optntons.

White, 497 N.E.2d at 905.
6AJd. at 906. See supra note 31.
65
497 N .E.2d at 906.

63

MJd.
67
394 u.s. 459 (1969).
68441 u.s. 780 .(1979).
69
475 u.s. 66 (1986).
70
468 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 1984).
7
l428 N.E.2d 234 (Ind. 1981).

•
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A.

White's Interpretation of Austin and Gertnan and its Effect
•

To reiterate briefly, the Indiana Supreme Court in German held that
the then-extant advisement statute, Indiana Code section 35-4.1-1-3, 72
mandated strict compliance by a trial court, 73 in order to determine that
a guilty plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. As to
the specific facts involved in German, this de.cision meant that advisements
present in a written plea agreement were inadequate. 74 Considering the
mandatory language of the statute ''The court shall not a~cept a plea
of guilty from the defendant without first addressing the defendant" 75 this result seems only logicaL This wording is not discretionary, and the
German holding is akin to the result the United States Supreme Court
reached in McCarthy v. United States, 16 a case of direct appeal from
a trial court's failure to follow Federal Rule 11. Shortly after German,
and probably as its logical consequence, the In4iana legislature passed
into law an amended advisement statute that includes mandatory language77
similar to the earlier version but also adds the following: ''Any variance
from the ~equirements of this section that does not violate a constitutional
right of the defendant is not a basis for setting aside a plea of guilty. " 78
As a response to that enactment, the Indiana Supreme Court declared
the new provision a nullity in Austin. 79 Although the White court intimates
the Austin court backed away from its German rationale of strict construction of the mandatory language of the statute in order to pronounce
a new rationale, 80 a careful reading shows the White court misconstrued
Austin.
Austin stated that strict construction of the mandatory language is
a reason for requiring strict compliance with the advisement. However;

See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
11
"We hold that it is the duty of the trial judge to comply strictly with the terms
of IND. CoDE § 35-4.1-1-3. . .. " 428 N.E.2d at 236.
74/d.
75 See supra note 19.
76
394 U.S. 459 (1969). The Supreme Court declared:
[W]e hold that a defendant is entitled to plead anew if a United States district
court accepts his guilty plea without fully adhering to the procedure provided
for in Rule 11. This decision is based solely upon our construction of Rule 11
and is made pursuant to our supervisory power over the lower federal courts;
we do not reach any of the constitutional arguments petitioner urges as additional
grounds for reversal.
/d. at 463-64.
77
"Th~ court shall not accept a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill at the time
of the crime, without first detenuining that the defendant ... , IND. CODE § 35-35-12(a) (Supp. 1987).
18
/d. § 35-35-I-2(c).
79
468 N.E.2d 1027, 1029 (Ind. 1984).
80497 N.E.2d 893, 899 (Ind. 1986).
72

'
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it is not the only reason. 81 Not having had reason to reach the constitutional issue prior to that time as courts are wont to do 82 the A ustin
court plucked up its courage and did just that.. In holding that Dotsie
Austin was entitled to an advisement of his minimum possible sentences,
the court stated:
An understanding of the range of possible sentences is, among
other factors, essential to an informed judgment as to whether
or not to enter a guilty plea. This is self-evident. An accused,s
entitlement to such advisements, therefore, flows from his due
process right to be sheltered from the consequences of a guilty
plea entered on less than an informed judgment and not from
the legislative inclusion of it in its codification. The legislature
that
are
may, as a matter of public policy, require advisements
.
not of such dimension, but it could not eliminate the requirements
of those essential to an informed judgment, which includes the
one omitted by the court that accepted the guilty plea. 83

•

•

The Austin court further found the· legislature's harmless error provision
in Indiana Code section 35-35-1-2(c) a nullity for a second reason the
harmless error doctrine is within the exclusive domain of the courts and
therefore outside the domain of the legislature. 84 The White court attempted to tear this reasoning apart.
First, the White opinion interpreted the Austin court's "due process"
right as being the bundle of advisements given to a defendant, then
went on to show that not all those rights are afforded by· the Constitution. 85 To the extent that not all these advisements are explicitly within
the federal Constitution, the White court is correct. 86 After reaching this
conclusion, the court also declared that the Indiana Constitution does
not offer this "due process" right either. The court then explained how
the Austin court's misapprehension of due process makes the opinion
''not fully reliable.' ' 87 The White court made one fundamental error in
its analysis. It failed to consider the full Austin pronouncement that
"(a]n accused's entitlement to such advisement ... flows from his due

process right . ... " 88
It is a basic tenet of criminal law that a guilty plea must be voluntary,
knowing and intelligent; otherwise it has been obtained in violation of
•

468 N .E.2d at 1028.
82
See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1979).
13
468 N.E.2d at 1028 (Emphasis added).
~Id. at 1029.
8
'497 N.E.2d at 897.
86
See infra notes, 118-22 and accompanying text.
87
497 N .E.2d at 898.
88
468 N.E.2d at 1028 (Emphasis added).
81
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the individual's due process rights. 89 The White court missed the point
when it focused on the discrete advisements. It is the ''waiver of . . .
'a known right or privilege'' ' 90 that is the constitutionally protected right
with which Austin was concerned. The Austin court's decision to require,
on due process grounds, an advisement of the minimum sentencing a
defendant may be waiving in order to engender a proper plea was within
its prerogative to interpret constitutional law and was within the bounds
of dicta pronounced by Boykin v. Alabama. 91 Similarly, the White court's
decision that due process was not better served by requiring this advisement waiving a right not explicitly set forth in the Constitution was
its prerogative. It would have been much simpler to just say so, rather
than to find a flaw in Austin, because there is adequate precedent for
White'·s reasoning.:
The primary fact in White that must be remembered is that it
concerned a collateral attack on a guilty plea, vis-a. . vis a petition for
post-conviction relief, not a direct appeaL The extent to which the White
court recognized this fact exists in its citation to federal cases concerned
with collateral attacks on pleas. 92 As the White case indicates and independent research reveals, there is no single method of approaching
review of a guilty plea on collateral attack, be it by habeas corpus,
motion to vacate sentence93 or a petition for post. .cortviction relief.
Traditionally; collateral attack on a guilty plea in the federal system
requires a showing of a constitutional or jurisdictional defect rendering
the judgment void, "a fundamental defect which inherently results in
a complete miscarriage of justice, [or] an omission inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of fair procedure.' ' 94 The translation to an Indiana
post-conviction procedure framework is found generally in the rules for
post-conviction remedies:
•

See, e.g., Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 ( 1976); Boykin v. Alabama;

89

395 U.S. 238, 243 n.S (1969); McCarthy v~ United States, 394 U.S. 4;59, 466 .(1969).
90
McCarthy,
394 U.S. at 466 (quoting
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
.
.
.
91
A majority of criminal convictions are obtained after a plea of guilty. If
these convictions are to be insulated from attack, the trial court is best advised
to conduct an on the record examination of the defendant which should include,
inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature
of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the
offenses for which he is charged and
the permissible range of sentences. Com-.
.
monwealth ex rei. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 105-06, 237 A.2d 196, 197-98
(1968).
395 U.S. at 244 n.7 (Emphasis added).
92
E.g.; United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1978); Hill v. United States, 368
u.s. 424 (1962).
{
9328 U .S.C. § 2255 (1982).
94
Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. at 428; United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. at
783.
0
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(a) Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for,
a crime by a court of this state, and who claims:
(1) that the conviction or the- sentence was in violation of
the Constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws
of this state;
(2) that the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
..

..

(6) that the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to
col~ateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore

available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion,
petition, p-roceeding or remedy;
may institute at any time a proceeding under this Rule to secure
relief. 95
In the specific context of a collateral attack on a guilty plea, the goal
is to determine whether the defendant entered his plea voluntarily,
97
96
knowingly and intelligently, as a matter of due process. The entry
of conviction upon a plea not so entered is fundamental error, 98 thereby
creating justification for reversal by collateral attack. The major contention is what process is due to a guilty plea petitioner: what must a
guilty plea defendant know in order to make a voluntary choice of
pleading guilty rather than the alternative of standing trial? 99
In Indiana,_ the legislature has determined a statutory framework,
as discussed above, within which a trial court must work in order to
satisfy itself that the guilty plea defendant has been accorded his due
100
process rights. Basically, these statutes require a trial court to assure
itself that an unrepresented defendant has knowingly waived his right
to counsel, 101 that there is a factual basis for the plea, 102 that the plea
was not induced by promises, threats or force, 103 that the defendant
understands the nature of the charge against him, 104 and that he waives
certain rights and sentencing alternatives that might otherwise be available
to him. 10s Unfortunately, despite the ease with which a trial court and
P.

1 §' 1.
96
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644·45 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 243 (1964); Davis v. State, 446 N.E.2d 1317, 1321 (Ind. 1983); Brown v. State, 435
N.E.2d 582, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
91
Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647. ·
98
Brown, 435 N .E.2d at 584.
99
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
100
See suprQ note 31 and accompanying text.
101
IND. ConE § 35·35·1·1 (Supp. 1987).
102
IND. CODE § 35-35-1-3 (Supp. 1987).
103
IND. ConE- § 35-35-l-3(a) (Supp. 1987).
104
IND. CODE § 3S-35-1-2(a)(l) (Supp. 1987).
105
IND. CODE § 35-35-l-2(a)(2) (Supp. 1987).
9
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a prosecutor could follow these steps, many pleas have been accepted
without compliance with them, the White case being just one example
of many. German and Austin provided one answer to these errors by
mandating strict compliance with the statutes. 106 White provides another
by implying the statutes incorrectly call for more from trial courts than
due process requires. 107
One must remember that, after all is said and done, the interpretation
of the Constitution is the sole province of the. courts. 108 Regardless of
how the legislature may interpret it, the courts remain the final arbiters
of its construction and~ . th~s, of adjudging a guilty plea defendant's
rights to due process. To. that end, the White court has declared that
certain portions of the statutes are immutably required by due process:
"[U]nless the record reveals that the defendant knew or was advised at
the time of his plea that he was waiving his right to a jury trial, his
right of confrontation and his right against self incrimination, Boykin
will require that his conviction be vacated,'' or if the plea is entered
"after coercion, judicial or otherwise." 109 The absence of . the other
legislative requirements from a guilty plea record, such as the advisement
of Randy White's minimum possible sentence, is relegated to the fuzzy
zone of "colorable claims for relief" 110 upon which a petitioner may
prevail only by showing, by a preponderance of evidence, that he has
actually been misled in choosing to plead guilty over his alternatives. 111
To the extent that this conclusion conforms to accepted procedures on
post-conviction relief, the Indiana Supreme court appears to be correct.
However, insofar as White purports to reflect a proper standard of
attacking a guilty plea, it is incorrect.
The issue ultimately is whether the defendant voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently elected to plead guilty. Therefore, the inquiry should
be whether, given the evidence in the record at the post-conviction
proceeding, the petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was not accorded due process. To put the onus on the petitioner
at the post-conviction proceeding to show he w~s actually misled, as
White requires, is to further relieve the trial court and the prosecution
from est(!blishing an adequate record of the plea proceedings as mandated
by Boykin and its collateral attack progeny. 112 Certainly, a defendant's
having been misled could be part of the evidence establishing the lack
•

•

•

1()6See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.

497 N.E.2d at 897.
108Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 107, 155 N.E. 465, 469 (1927).
uw497 N. E .2d at 905.
110/d. at 9(}6,
107

/d.
112
See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
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of voluntariness and intelligence of his plea. But to make this single
inquiry, in addition to the four immutable requirements set forth above, 113
runs contrary to the clear message of Boykin.
This procedural distinction is, of course, merely an intellectual diversion, when in fact the issue in White is whether the trial court's
failure to follow the statute is essentially harmless error . 114 In other
words, is the absence of an advisement of a minimum possible sentence
a denial of due process? Although a liberal and well-devised opinion
from the Indiana Court of Appeals has described all the statutory
provisions as of constitutional dimension, 115 the fact remains that the
Indiana Supreme Court, as the highest court in the state, is the final
authority in this state on the parameters of due process set forth in
both the state and federal constitutions. In White, the supreme court
simply disagreed with the court of appeals and implicit~y declared that,
given the facts of Randy White's case, the error in failing to· advise
him of his minimum possible sentence was not of constitutional dimension
vis-a-vis due process. The trial court's error was not sufficient to afford
White °Collateral relief. 116
.
This result on the basis of harmless error and lack of prejudice has
sufficient precedent, 117 even if White's underlying rationale does not.
What remains to be seen is White's application in instances of other
omissions from the statutory advisements.

B.

The Advisements Required by Due Process

The White court set forth four advisements and/or inquiries absolutely mandated by due process. They are advisement of a defendant's
waiver of his right to a jury trial, his right of confrontation, and his
right against self-incrimination and, impliedly, an inquiry as to whether
the plea has been coerced. 118 The three advisements of waiver were borne
of the federal Constitution and are explicitly set forth in Boykin v.
Alabama. 119 The absence of any of these advisements in a plea proceeding
is a clear violation of due process, thereby voiding the conviction based

See supra text accompanying note 109.
114
See White, 497 N.E.2d at 905. See also United States v. Timmreck, 441 U~S. 780,
783 (1978) ("Such a violation is neither constitutional nor jurisdictional."); Hill v. U.S.,
368 u.s. 424, 428 (1962).
11
~Jones v. State, 467 N.E.2d 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
6
" White, 497 N.E.2d at 905-06.
117
E.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 42 (1985); United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S.
at 783.
118
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
119
395 U.S. at 243. See also McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
113

CRIMINAL LAW

1988]

101

thereon. 120 The inquiry into whether a defendant has been coerced is
the implied converse of an inquiry into voluntariness. This, too, has
been deemed essential to due process in Brady v. United States. 121 The
Indiana statutes require certain other advisements not set forth in White.• 22
Some of them should have been listed in White as evocative of due
process; others were rightfully omitted, insofar as White applies only
to collateral proceedings.
·
Evidently, Randy White appeared at his plea proceeding with counsel;
therefore, the advisement of waiver providing that "[a] plea of guilty
. . . shall not be accepted from a defendant unrepresented by counsel
who has not freely and knowingly waived his right to counsel'' was not
123
at issue. Rice v. 0/son•'-4_ elevated the knowing waiver of this constitutional right to the status of an element of due process in the guilty
plea setting. Although the White scenario did not need to address this
matter, the case's reliance on the Boykin factors as being absolute rights
leads to the conclusion that if the matter should arise in the proper
situation, the Indiana Supreme Court would find prima facie reversible
error in the absence of waiver of counsel.
Another element not addressed by White but still undeniably an
element of due process in the guilty plea proceeding is whether the
defendant '·'understands the nature of the charge against him." 12' It was
early established in Smith v. O,Grady 126 that a defendant must understand
the nature of the charge against him before he can voluntarily and
intelligently plead guilty. The Supreme Court later applied this requirement to collateral attacks in Henderson v. Morgan. 121 Under the circumstances, the Indiana Supreme Court can do no less than recognize
this factor also, despite its omission from the list in White. The con-stitutional mandate interpreted by the United States Supreme Court
demands it.
One advisement in Indiana Code section 35-35 . . 1-2 that has not yet
been treated as of constitutional dimension in the guilty plea setting is
the waiver of a "public and speedy trial by jury. " 128 Barker v. Wingo 129
.

.

u.oBoykin, 395 U.S. at 243.

t::a397 l).S. 742 (1970).
rnsee supra note 31 and accom.panying text.
11liND. CODE § 35 ..35-1-1 (Supp. 1987).
I2AJ24 u.s. 786, 791 (1945).
115IND. CoDE § 35-35-1-2(a)(l) (Supp. 1987). Closely associated with this determination
is the element requiring that "[t)he court shall not enter judgment upon a plea of guilty
. . . unless it is satisfied from its examination of the defendant or the evidence presented
that there is a factual basis for the plea.', IND. ConE § 35·35-1-J(b) (Supp .. 1987).
126
312 u.s. 329, 334 (1941).
12
'426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
111
IND. CoDE § 35-35-1-2(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1987).
129407 u.s. 514, 515-16 (1.972).
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clearly established a state court defendant's right to a speedy trial under
the Sixth Amendment; sound policy supports the argument in favor of
raising this right to the status of the Boykin rights. 13° For example,
many defendants do not make bail and must remain incarcerated in
local jails until trial and sentencing. Notoriously, these local jails even
in rural areas present such awful conditions that a defendant would
willingly plead guilty to gain transport to a perhaps le~s troublesome
facility. A defendant would surely want to know that ·a speedy trial is
available to him in order for him to make an informed choice whether
to plead guilty or to wait shortly for a trial. However, until the United
States Supreme Court adopts the position that the right to a speedy
trial is constitutionally mandated in the due process waiver of a pleading
defendant, it is highly unlikely, as evidenced by White, that the Indiana
Supreme Court will take such a position. 131 Additionally, one could argue
that a defendant could infer his right to a speedy trial by the speed
with which the state will allow him to plead guilty.
The next advisement of Indiana Code section 35-35-] ...2, and the
primary subject of White; is the advis.ement of the minimum and maximum sentences and the possibility of increased or consecutive sentences. 132
The Boykin majority alluded to the constitutional dimension of this
generic advisement in dictum when it cited to a state court opinion:
''the trial court is best advised to conduct an on the record examination
of the defendant which should include . . . the permissible range of
sentences." 133 However, in the absence of actually misleading a defendant
into pleading guilty because of his misunderstanding of the possible
sentences, u 4 the failure to make this advisement is usually relegated to
a designation as a technical violation only .135 The usefulness of further

See the dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Johnson v. Ohio,
4'19 U.S. 924 (1974). Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, states
that enumeration in Boykin is "illustrative, not exhaustive" and should therefore include
the right to a speedy trial. 419 U.S. at 926 (Douglas, J ., dissenting).
131
However, the Indiana Supreme Court, relying on the holding of German v. State,
428 N.E.2d 234 (Ind. 1981), held that on a petition for post-conviction relief, a defendant's
plea of guilty would be vacated where the trial judge accepting sucb plea failed to inform
the defendant that by so pleading. he was thereby waiving his right to a speedy trial.
Hayenga v. State, 463 N.E.2d 1383, 1384 (Ind. 1984).
132lND. CooE § 35-35-l-2(a)(3) (Supp. 1987).
133
8oykin v. Alabama, 39S U.S. at 244 n.7 (1969) (quoting Commonwealth ex rei.
West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 105-06, 237 A.2d 196, 197-98 (1968)).
134
See, e.g., United States v. Sharon, 812 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1987) (special parole
not described); United States v. Hawthorne, 806 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1986) (failure to inform
of imposition of restitution).
135See, e.g., United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979). See also Hill v. Lockhart,
•
474 u.s. 52 (1985).
130
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argument that this advisement is paramount to a defendant's ~ue process
rights is minimal.
The final element set forth in the Indiana statutes declares that if
a trial court accepts a plea premised upon an agreement, the court is
bound by the terms of that agreement. 136 As a practical matter, this
information is essentially superfluous. Why would a defendant choose
to enter into a plea agreement if he did not fully intend to get what
he bargained for? This information probably has little to do with any
due process rights but is merely a vestige of the prior adviseme~t that
a trial court was not bound by any plea agreements. 137 The failure to
make this earlier advisement was a violation of due process. 138 Under
the current version of the statute this advisement has little actual value
for purposes of establishing grounds for collateral attack.
Although the foregoing elements were established by the Indiana
legislature and do not all have per se constitutional derivation, most of
the factors do have precedential force from the federal courts in their
interpretation of the United States Constitution by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment139 as well as by direct mandate from the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 140 Of course, not only are states bound
by the Constitution in their interpretation of constitutional rights, particularly those of due process, but they may also re.q uire a higher standard .
Inasmuch as the Indiana Supreme Court has impliedly declared in White
that the General Assembly will not govern the definition of due process
in creating a higher standard than that required of federal courts, the
question remains whether there exists anything else which is inherent in
due process which the supreme court may also have ignored.
The Indiana Constitution has been oft-neglected in the consideration
of a pleading defendant's due process rights. Two sections are of particular application in such a case:
All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done
to him in his person, property, or reputation shall have remedy
by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and
without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and

ConE § 35·35-l-2(a)(4) (Supp. 1987).
137
IND. ConE § 35-4.1-l-3(e) (repealed 1981).
131
See, e.g., Pharms v. State, 477 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
139
See, e.g., Robbins v. State, 251 Ind. 313, 321, 241 N.E.2d 148, 153 (1968). For
federal cases involving state court defendant, see, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 244
(1969); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976).
·
140
"No person shall . . • be deprived of life; liberty or property, without due process
of law ... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. For two examples of federal defendants, see McCarthy
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) and United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780
(1979). However, both of these cases focused upon FEn. R. CRIM. P. 11.
u 6 IND.
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without delay . 141
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right
to a public trial, by an impartial jury, in the county in which
the offense shall have been committed; to be heard by himself
and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor. 142

•

The combined meaning of these two provisions tracks fairly closely with
the same rights set forth above and interpreted within the United States
143
Constitution.
The state rights identical to the federal rights ·would
receive similar application by the supreme court. For example, the state
right to jury trial must be announced to a pleading defendant.144 On
the other hand, there seems little doubt that as to the interpretation of
the federal right to a speedy and public trialt the Indiana Supreme Court
would treat the same state constitutional provision with like regard. . That
is, such a right is not within the meaning of due process. 145 It does not
appear, from the tenor of White, that the supreme court will expand
the- Indiana Constitution's Hdue course of law"' beyond that prescribed
for the ·united States Constitution's "due process of law." 146 However,
there is one very serious deficiency in Indiana's criminal procedure which
either will have to actually be rectified or must also be included in a
pleading defendant's advisement: the right to a direct appeal.
The Indiana Constitution has been interpreted and applied by Indiana
courts as giving criminal defendants the right to appeaL 147 Although
148
there is contradictory authority on the issue, the most recent statement
on the matter appears in Judy v. State. 149 In that case the supreme court
reviewed Steven Judy's waiver of his right to appeal his death penalty
case-. Acknowledging that review of the death penalty phase itself was
not waiveable, the court declared that Judy's waiver of his right to

141

•

4

IND. CONST.

art. 1, § 12.

iJd. at § 13.

See
...See
145
See
146
See
143

supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text .
supra notes 31 and accompanying text.
supra notes 128·31 and accompanying text.

White, 497 N.E.2d at 897 n.4, and cases cited therein ("due process·" is
interchangeable with ''' due course").
141
See Judy v. State~ 275 Ind. 145, 157, 416 N.E.2d 95., 101 (1981); Peterson v. State,
246 Ind. 452, 456, 206 N.E.2d 371, 372 (1965); Woods v. State, 426 N.E.2d 107 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1981); see also IND. Cons § 35-3.8-4-l (Supp. 1987).
148
See, e.g., Robbins v. State, 251 Ind. 323, 325, 242 N.E.2d 925, 927 (1969); In re
Pisello, 155 Ind. App. 484, 488, 293 N.E.2d 228, 230 (1973).
149
275 Ind. 145, 416 N.E.2d 95 (1981).
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appeal his conviction must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary . 150
Although the court declared in an earlier case, Riner v. Raines, 151 that
the right to appeal a criminal conviction is not a necessary element of
due process, 152 the Jur;Jy decision belies that interpretation. This issue
would ordinarily be of no moment but for the fact that pleading defendants are typically confined to challenging their pleas by collateral
attack· .rather than by direct appeal.
For reasons that are unclear, in the eatly 1980's the Indiana appellate
courts began ruling that a criminal defendant could not attack his plea
by a motion to correct error and direct appeal. 153 Evidently, these holdings
express the courts' beliefs that the language in the Indiana Rules of
Civil Procedure and of Criminal Procedure pertaining to the appeal
from judgments referring directly to "trial," "verdict," or "decision," 154
should be interpreted to preclude those instances where one pleads guilty
rather than proceeds to trial. It is difficult to understand these holdings,
however, in light of the clearly constitutional dimensions of the right,
and the language of Indiana Code section 35-38-4-l(a): An appeal to
the supreme court or the court of appeals may be taken by the defendant:
(1) as a matter of right from any judgment in a criminal action; and
(2) in accordance with this chapter. 155
A plea by a criminal defendant is just as much a conviction as if
he had gone to trial. 156 Furthermore, the rule for post-conviction relief
affords guilty plea defendants the opportunity to file a belated appeal. 157
It is therefore perplexing why attacks on guilty pleas are reduced to the
realm of petitions for post-conviction relief.
This examination of the law leads to the inevitable conclusions that
the appellate courts are wrong and that the law does afford pleading
defendants the opportunity to appeal,. or that the law actually does not
afford this right. In either circumstance, the law is ~qually clear that
if defendants convicted after trial do have the right, but defendants
convicted after pleading do not, then the pleading defendants are being
denied their rights under equal protection of the law .us Although the
lSOJd. at 150, 416 N.E.2d at 97 (emphasis added).
i"274 Ind. 113, 409 N.E.2d 575 (1980).
u 2Jd. at 118, 409 N.E.2d at 578.
1 3
' See, e.g., Stone v. State, 444 N.E.2d 1214 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Woods v. State,
426 N .E.2d 107 (Ind. 1981).

See IND. R. CIV. P. 59.

154

"'IND. ConE § 35-38-4-1 (Supp. 1987).

'"See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
u'IND. R. P. PosT-CONVICTION

REMEDIES

2 § l provides: "Any defendant convicted

after a trial_or plea of guilty may petition the court of conviction for permission to file
a belated motion for new trial ... "
u•''No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person
within its judsdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNST. amend XIV, § 1.
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initial premise of the following statement regarding due proce$s is flawed
in the wake of Judy, it is hard to deny the_ ultimate import of this
declaration by the Indiana Supreme Court: ''[T]he right to appeal i~
criminal cases is not a necessary element of due process although to the
extent that a state provides such a right, the equal protection clause
159
would require all affected to be treated alike." Thus, this right is
elevated to a federal due process issue, and the failure of the Indiana
courts to advise of this right is reversible error.
Two options are open to cure this serious flaw in the system. The
ideal solution would be for the courts to interpret the Indiana Constitution
to include the right to appeal and thereafter to apply such a right equally
among defendants. The second option would be for the General Assembly
to amend the appropriate statutes and trial rules to invoke clearly this
due process right to pleading defendants. Merely to advise a pleading
defendant that by pleading guilty he waives the right to appeal because
this right concerns the procedure surrounding the plea is not an option.
Rather, a pleading defendant must be informed of his right to a direct
appeal which may- be waived if such waiver is voluntary, knowing and
intelligent. 160The ramifications of properly inserting this right in the matter of
due process may have little or no practical effect on current procedure.
It is fairly common knowledge that most attacks on guilty pleas fall
outside the limitations for a direct appeal, either with respect to the
passage of time 161 or as a substantive matter of the belated appealsrequirements.162 Collateral attacks are typically lodged when a defendant
discovers he may be charged as an habitual offender 163 if he cannot
avoid an earlier guilty plea conviction. The absence of an advisement
regarding the defendant's right to appeal constitutes fundamental error
as a denial of equal protection under the law. Failure of a trial court
to make a record of this right ranks with a similar failure to make the
Boykin advisements in mandating reversal. Futhermore, the effect on
the possibilities open to defendants who can timely perfect an appeal
could be enormous because McCarthy v. United States164 clearly mandates
reversal for any omission fro.m the federal guilty plea statutes if brought
on direct appeal .
'

Riner v. Raines, 274 Ind. 113, 118, 409 N .E.2d 575, 578 (1980) (emphasis added).
160
But see United States v. Frazier. 705 F .2d -903. 908 n.8 (7th Cir. 1983) (in which
the opinion appears to deal with the right to appeal a related motion to suppress, but
uses unfortunately broad language such that it could be construed as the right to appeal
the plea).
161
IND. R. CIV. p. 59.
162
IND. R. P. PosT-CoNVICTION REMEDIES 2.
163
lND. CoDE § 35-50..2-8 (Supp. 1987).
164
394 U.S., 4S9. 463-64 (1969).
159
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Although it addresses the construction of the federal rule and its
specific terms, the import of the McCarthy opinion is that an appealing
defendant should not have to bear the burden of disproving the voluntariness of his plea. Rather, all resort to fact . . finding is eliminated
and the court must determine error on the plea record alone. 165 Omissions
are prima facie reversible error. The same result would be particularly
appropriate in Indiana where the motion to correct error does not
contemplate additional fact-finding after judgment, except for newly
discovered evidence. 166
The problem that continues to fester in all this, of course, is the
effect of the recent statutory amendment providing: ''Any variance from
the requirements of this section that does not violate a constitutional
right of the defendant is not a basis for setting aside a plea of guilty.'' 167
Can the courts apply this "harmless error'' standard to get around the
mandate of McCarthy v. United States? 168
A differently composed Indiana Supreme Court concluded, in Austin
v. State, 169 that the .G eneral Assembly "may not fetter the judiciary with
its concept of harmless error'' 170 and declared Indiana Code section 3533-1-2(c) a nullity. Although criticized heartily by the White court, 171
Austin was without doubt correct in this regard. The due process accorded
to pleading defendants is, by and large, governed by the advisement of
waiver of federal constitutional rights. This advisement procedure itself
emanates from the Constitution. In most respects then, the ''harmless
error'' provision is an empty vessel it applies to virtually nothing raised
in the statutes. The "harmless error'' provision is also of no moment
in light of the clear import of the language of the Supreme Court in
Chapman v. Ca/ifornia172 when it addressed a state constitutional provision undercutting a federal constitutional right: "With faithfulness to
the constitutional union of the states, we cannot leave to the States the
..

~t ~~1661ND. R. CIV. P. 59(A)(6).
1

''JrGi.

"'IND. ConE § 35-35-1-2(c) (Supp. 1987).
168
A similar provision is currently in place in FED. R. CRJM. P., Rule ll(h): "Any
variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not ~ffect substantial rights
shall be disregarded." To date, the Supreme Court bas not addressed a challenge to the
validity of this provision although it has been used in matters of direct appeal by lower
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 461, 465 (4th Cir. 1986); United
States v. De le Puente, 755 F.2d 313, 314-IS (3d Cir. 1985); but see United States v.
Ramos. 810 F.2d 308, 312 (1st Cir. 1987) (this circuit may not follow Rule ll(h) when
defendant moves to withdraw his plea).
·
1
69468 N.E.2d 1027 (1984).
170
/d. at 1029.
171
White v. State. 497 N.E.2d 893, 897-99 (Ind. 1986).
112
386
18 (1967) .
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formulation of the authoritative laws, rules, and remedies assigned to
protect people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed
rights.'' 173 This is not to say the Indiana courts may not find a violation
of a constitutional · right is harmless error pursuant to the judicially
formulated Rule 61 of the Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure. 174 That
ability is specifically reserved in Chapman. 1' 5 H·owever, that case does
negate subsection 2(c) and denies to the General Assembly the power
to formulate a rule of its own. Thus, subsection 2(c) can have no legal
effect on the review of a guilty plea in Indiana, either on collateral
attack or direct appeal. But can the Indiana courts still find ''harmless
error'' on direct ·appeal?
Because McCarthy v. United States176 was not decided on constitutional grounds but on rules of statutory construction, the answer to
that question has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court. However,
the very nature of a direct appeal is going to make it extremely difficult
to find harmless error because review is confined to the guilty plea
record. Thus, almost any omission from the statutes is error for lack
of evidence otherwise. The defendant has no burden to produce anything
but the record. Realistically, a challenge to the ever thorny failure to
advise of the minimum or maximum sentences will be naught if the
defendant was sentenced within the parameters of the possible sentences,
as in White, Such failure will probably still be deemed harmless error
pursuant to Rule 61. Except for being within the general due process
considerations regarding an advisement of the consequences of a plea,
this advisement is not otherwise supported by an independent constitutional right. So, unless the Indiana Supreme Court changes its mode
of review drastically in the near future, it is hardly likely it will follow
McCarthy's method of statutory construction to require strict adherence
to the statute on this particular element, even on direct appeal. All the
other elements, however, have been specifically denominated to be of
federal dimension and not omissible in such instance. 177 Thus, the Indiana
Supreme Court will have to re-examine some of its current practices
applicable to collateral attack when faced with a direct appeal.
•

C.

Retroactive Application

One of the major questions arising from White is whether its standard
should be applied retroactively, that is, to all reviews of guilty pleas

/d. at 21.
174
IND. R. CIV. P. 61.
175
386 U.S. at 21-22.
176
394 u.s. 459 (1969).
177
See supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
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without regard to when they were entered. The White court hinted at
the answer to this question in its disposition of Randy White's petition:
''If appellant has any other basis upon which to establish that his plea
was not voluntary and intelligent, he may file a new petition.'' 178 Similar
notations were rnade in subsequent cases decided by the Indiana Supreme
Court. 179
Patton v. State, 180 an Indiana Court of Appeals case, was the first
to confront the problem of retroactivity. Patton's appellate brief reached
the court after the White decision, and in it he argued that White should
be limited to a prospective application only. The court of appeals disagreed, providing, however, only the rationale noted above: the White
standard was applied to Randy White's petition.t 81 This stands, the court
concluded, as precedent for the proposition that White has been given
retroactive effect. The court determined that White was to be applied
retroactively, despite the fact that the White court did not elucidate the
reasons for retroactivity. The Patton court went no further in its explication of the problem. 182
Even though the precedent for retroactivity has been established,
inquiry into the question remains fruitful, particularly given that the
Patton decision does not address the precise contours of the argument
which may be made.
The prior case of German v. State 183 was given prospective application
only. The supreme court, in Martin v. State, 184 held that "there is no
sound reason for retroactive application of German.'' 185 The decision to
apply German prospectively should shed some light on the rationale
behind the decision to apply White retroactively.
It should be noted that, as a general matter, constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws do not apply to judicial precedent.
The focus of ex post facto prohibitions is upon the legislature and the

White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893, 906 (Ind. 1986).
119
E.g., Simpson v. State, 499 N .E.2d 205, 206 (Ind. 1986); Reid v. State, 499 N .E.2d
207, 208 (Ind. 1986); Merriweather v. State, 209, 211 (Ind. 1986).
180507 N.E.2d 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
181
/d. at 626.
112
/d.; see also Buskirk v. State, 511 N .E.2d 305 (Ind. 1987). Although the Buskirk
case occurred outside the survey period, it is noteworthy because Justice Pivarnik's opinion
held White to be retroactive. Unfortunately, Buskirk cited Patton as precedent. /d. at
· 305. The Patton court stated, ''Explication of the policy and its constitutional ramifications
is best left to the highest court of our state." 507 N.E.2d at 626.
183
428 N.E.2d 234 (Ind. 1981).
114
480 N.E.2d 543 (Ind. 1985) (clarifying conflict between Johnson v. State, 471
N.E.2d 1107 (Ind. 1984) and William v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1036 (Ind. 1984)).
11
'Martin, 480 N.E.2d at 547.
178
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desire to limit its authority. 186 The litigant seeking to compel, as with
the German standard, or avoid, as with the White standard, retroactivity
is thus left to a common law,. or perhaps due process, approach to the
issue. The latter analysis usually employs three factors, none of which
apparently predominate. They are: (a) the purpose to be served by the
new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities
on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of Justice
of a retroactive application of the new standards . 187
The purpose of German's requirement of strict compliance with the
statute relating to guilty pleas was two-fold. It was designed to insure
proper advice to the pleader and create ease of appellate review . 188 German
did not affect the fact-finding process. White, on the other hand, does
affect the fact-finding process intimately. The ultimate fact to be found
in a post-conviction proceeding for review of a guilty plea is whether
the plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently . 189 White
directly bears upon this issue. White asked, would the petitioner have
pleaded guilty if the omitted advisement had been given? 190 A finding
of a potential change in plea is highly probative on the issue of whether
th_e plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently. Thus, the purpose to
be served by the new standards is to reflect accurately the voluntariness
of the plea. The purpose of the White standard, therefore, is to serve
as a more accurate barometer of the correct result. That is, was the
guilty plea accepted correctly? This purpose militates strongly in favor
of a retroactive application. Standards which bear upon the fact-finding
process should generally be applied uniformly and retroactively. 191
However, under the foregoing, unfairness can and probably did
result to petitioners in a position such as White. This is a component
of the second portion of the analysis, the factor of the degree of reliance
by petitioners. Usually, the test applied is whether there was reliance
by law enforcement officials, especially in the area of search and seizure
law. However, Judge Shields in Bryant v. State192 aptly noted that when
the rule (or ·standard) under consideration is more restrictive in nature,
the analysis more germane is the degree of the reliance by defendants
(or petitioners).
•

.

.

.

.

See Sumpter v. State, 264 Ind. 117, 340 N .E.2d 764, cert. denied. 425 U.S. 952

186

(1976).
Bryant v. State, 446 N.E.2d 364, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)). See generally Rowley v. State, 483 N.E.2d 1078 (Ind. 1985).
188
Martin, 480 N.E.2d at 547.
189
See supra notes 89 and accompanying text.
190
497 N .E.2d at 906.
191
See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
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44.6 N.E.2d 364, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
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Randy White's brief, and those in other cases which follow closely
~he White decision, demonstrate the degree of petitioners' reliance. White
did resist transfer on the ground that the issue of reexamination of the
standard of German and Austin was not appropriately before the Indiana
Supreme Court. Yet White seemed to argue only that German and Austin
193
mandated vacation of his plea. Thus, the degree of reliance was
substantial. Moreover, the new rule, while having its basis in prior case
law, is a radical and abrupt departure from immediate prior precedent.
German and Austin were overruled by name and in full.
White does seek to ameliorate the harshness that the abrupt change
caused. Randy White was given, somewhat cryptically, a second chance
to vindicate his position. The disposition does give White the opportunity
to refile his petition, provided he has "any other basis upon which to
establish that his plea was not voluntary and intelligent.'' 194 The extent
to which this gives White the chance to relitigate the voluntariness of
his plea, particularly concerning the issues which he raised in his first
appeal, is problematic. As Patton noted, there are pitfalls in relitigation,
not the least of which are waiver and estoppel. 195 Nevertheless, Randy
White was given the chance to at least reopen his case despite the
problems which reopening may create.
The third component of the retroactivity analysis is that of the
burden on the administration of justice. The White court viewed the
overturning of guilty pleas as an inordinate burden to the system. The
court wrote:

•

Routine reversal of convictions on technical grounds imposes
substantial costs on society. Chief Justice Designate Rehnquist
recently enumerated these costs, and we paraphrase his description of them. Jurors, witnesses, judges, lawyers, and prosecutors
may be required to commit further time and other resources to
repeat a trial which has already taken place. The victims are
caused to relive frequently painful experience in open court. The
erosion of memory and the dispersal of witnesses may well make
a new trial difficult or even impossible. If the latter is the case,
an admitted perpetrator will be rewarded with freedom from
prosecution. Such results prejudice society's interest in the prompt
administration of justice, reduce the deterrent value of any pun-

White, 497 N.E.2d at 895.
194
/d. at 906 (emphasis added).
195
1n Patton, the petitioner argued that, beyond waiver and estoppel, he might be
subject to an increased sentence under the revised rules. Patton's argument made in the
context of requesting a remand for the purpose of meeting the White stand~rd, was
reje.cted. 507 N.E.2d 624, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
193
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ishment, and hamper the rehabilitation of wrongdoers. 196
Fortunately, the court which created German and Austin concurred
in this assessment. In limiting German to prospective application only,
the court wrote in Martin v. State:
Retroactive application could only result in the vacatipg of many
judgments resting upon guilty pleas actually given knowingly and
voluntarily or if not so given, nevertheless, given under circumstances rendering deficiency in the advisements harmless error.
The burden upon the administration of justice in such cases is
overwhelming. 197
Thus, even though the Martin and White courts disagreed as to the
result to be reached regarding prospective and retrospective application
of the respective standards, both agreed in their assessment of the burden
to the administration of justice with regard to the standard.
The traditional analysis of retroactive application of precedent there-·
fore suggests that White be given full retroactive effect. White bears
upon the ultimate issue of the correctness of a guilty plea, seeks to limit
by its own terms the harshness of overturning German and Austin, and
will work a reduction,
in the long run, of vacation of guilty pleas and
.
the resultant full criminal litigation. Retroactive application is probably
the ,correct result, particularly because the White court overruled Austin
and thus foreclosed any contentions of whether the court's decision
impairs vested, substantive rights to persons having pleaded guilty under
the previous standards.
V.

•

EFFECT oF

White

oN INDIANA PosT-CoNVICTION PROCEDURE

As stated earlier, the Indiana Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction
Remedies are designed to effectuate the following goals: a simple and
expeditious procedure; a single procedure obviating the need for state
habeas corpus or corum n.obis proceedings; disposition on the merits of
the claims whenever possible; and elimination of subsequent post-conviction petitions by the same petitioner concerning the same conviction. 198
One must wonder to what extent the changed standard of review
announced by White v. State will serve these goals. Two caveats are in
order. First, White is merely a change in the way in which guilty pleas
are taken in terms of the requisite advisements. Second, and relatedly,
White is not procedural. It . does nothing to change the manner of

White, 497 N.E.2d at 905.
191
Martin v. State, 480 N.E.2d 543; 547 (Ind. 1985).
198
See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
196
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processing post-conviction cases . Nevertheless, White may, as a practical
matter,. have an impact on the degree to which the post--conviction relief
rules serve the stated and implicit goals.
'
First, White's immediate impact is to impose a new threshold technical requirement with regard to pleading. To be successful, a petitioner
must allege facts which could, if proven, lead to the conclusion that,
but for the omitted advisement, the petitioner would not have pleaded
guilty . 199 Though the pleading requirement may be relatively simple, it
is still a threshold requirement. Inartful or unaware pleaders, particularly
those appearing pro se, could lose the opportunity to litigate fully their
claim should they fail to allege both the necessary result and cause.
That is, the defendant must allege that a plea of guilty would not have
been entered if the trial court had given its constitutionally required
advisement. Setting to one side the issue of the propriety of requiring
such proof, there is little doubt that disposal of claims on pleading
grounds has become a much greater possibility. This approach appears
to be in conflict with the stated desire to dispose of claims on their
•
merits.
Second, White actually in~reases, rather than decreases, the probability of subsequent petitions concerning the same guilty plea. As noted,
the standard for guilty pleas has changed five times in less than ten
years. 200 While the reality may differ from the perception, the perception
must be that a second petition for post-conviction relief gives at least
some opportunity for .further review under a new and different standard.
The White case itself demonstrates this. Randy White was given, in the
court's disposition, a new opportunity to allege and prove facts which
would meet the standard. 201 Thus, White's case results in two trial court
decisions and inevitable appellate court reviews. This result was extended
to all cases in which trial court disposition had not yet occurred when
White was handed down. 202 It may fairly extend to all potential litigants
seeking a ''second bite at the apple'' under a new standard, regardless
of whether that standard actually increases the chances of success (which

White, 497 N.E.2d at 905 ("[The petitioner] needs to plead specific facts from
which a finder of fact could conclude.... ~, (emphasis added)).
200
See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
101
White, 497 N.E.2d at 906.
202
E.g., Simpson v. State, 499 N .E.2d 205, 206 (Ind. 1986); Reid v. State, 499 N .E.2d
207, 208 (Ind. 1986); Merriweather v. State, 499 N.E.2d 209, 211 (Ind. 1986). In all three
cases, the court wrote:
We note that appellant''s petition for post-conviction relief and proceedings
thereon were predicated on case law existing before our recent decision in White
which reviewed and revised- the applicable burden of pleading and proof. Therefore, if appellant has any other basis upon which to establish that his plea was
not voluntary and intelligent, he may file a new petition.
199
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it does not). As more of the issues raised by White become settled,
litigation may decrease. Yet, at present, there can be little doubt that
more, not less, litigation is the immediate result of White. Certainly
there is no empirical evidence to suggest
that post- White pleaders will
•
be deterred from pursuing any available post-conviction relief.
Finally, the White standard begs for full factual litigation., Assuming.
that a petitioner has shown an omitted advisement, the trial court's. work
is not done as it was under German/Austin. 203 The court must still
inquire as to whether the petitioner's plea would have reasonably changed.,
Further, assuming that the petitioner would testify in the affirmative in
this regard, it is then incumbent upon the State to demonstrate the
reasonableness of the position that the petitioner would not have changed
the plea.. T,his evidence, in the nature of rebuttal evidence, must be
objective in nature and will probably center on the facts and circumstances
of the plea agreement, the petitioner's prior involvement, if any, with
the criminal justice system, 204 and the strength of the proof of the crime
itself. None seems necessarily amenable to summary factual determination, and could lead to virtually a full trial on the crime charged.
Though one must keep in mind the desire to provide for disposition on
the merits, that goal of post-conviction relief statutes is not necessarily
served by increasing the factual determinations needed for ultimate resolution. Increasing the litigable fact questions may also be a disservice
to the goal of an expeditious ·procedure.
In summary, White does have· an impact upon the post-conviction
procedure as a whole, despite the fact that it is only changing the
standard of appellate review. It imposes an additional pleading .and proof
requirement upon
petitioners, causes an increase (at least for the present)
.
in the number of post-conviction relief decisions which must be made
and also opens up the possibility of much more involved factual determinations. 205
•

'

.

See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
lOt'See Burns v. State, 500 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. 1986) (correct advisement in previous
guilty plea hearing cured error of omitted advisement in case under review).
wsone other effect of White upon the post-conviction process should be noted. In
three cases in the survey period, appellate courts held that denial of post..conviction relief
in a summary fashion was inappropriate when a public defender has been .appointed to
represent a petitioner but has not yet amended the pro se petition. Holliness v. State,
496 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. 1986); Stoner v. State, 506 N.E.2d 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987);
Colvin v. State, 501 N.E.2d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). As noted in Stoner, ~'The rationale
is a pro se petitioner seeking post-conviction relief is given leave to amend his petition
as a matter of right by Indiana Rule of Post-Conviction Relief 1, § 4(c)!' 506 N.E.2d
at 838.
·
Under White, the court may look to the entire record to ascertain whether the plea
was correctly accepted. 497 N .E.2d 893, 905. In determining if a petitioner would not
203
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VI.

CONCLUSION

White is susceptible to attack on numerous grounds, not the least
of which is that it represents yet another change in guilty plea review.
Beyond the difficulties of this fifth change in ten years which White
creates, the case rests on faulty precedent and an ineffective refutation
of Ailstin and German.
Nevertheless, White is the latest pronouncement in the area, and
petitioners seeking to obtain relief under the White standard are left
too little in the way of novel argument, and less in the way of meeting
the standard itself. Post-conviction petitioners will likely be able to make
gains only in the Boykin rights area, such as with Henderson, or in the
area of pursuing a direct appeal. If this is truly the case, then one must
hope that with these limited avenues for relief, the Indiana Supreme
Court will, at minimum, leave White in place longer than its predecessors
so that petitioners may pursue federally based rights without concern
for vacillating state standards.

have pleaded guilty, the court may look objectively at the record. See Granger v. State,
499 N.E.2d 743, 745 (Ind. 1986). These two items, when coupled with the post-conviction
court's authority for summary disposition of the petitioner under Rule 1, § 4(f) of Indiana
Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction (Remedies), may cause an increase in the number
of summary dispositions without action by the public defender's office because under
White, the record alone may be a sufficient basis upon which to deny relief. The holdings
of the three cases above may be, therefore, subject to new scrutiny and clarification in
light of White .
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